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I. INTR~DUCTI~N 
It is now well known that there are conditions under which mixed 
strategy equilibria exist in n-person games where players have payoff 
functions that are neither quasiconcave nor continuous. For the most part, 
analyses of these equilibria have focused either on general conditions for 
existence, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987), or on 
the derivation of particular symmetric equilibrium mixed strategies, as in 
Varian (1980). To date, a complete characterization of equilibria in this 
class of n-person games has not been addressed.’ 
Our initial goal in starting the present line of research was to investigate 
uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of games of this type. It turns 
out, however, that the question appears to be complex and model specific. 
Thus, in this paper, we focus exclusively on Varian’s (1980) seminal model 
of sales. While this may seem particularly restrictive, many economic 
problems, such as the “all-pay auction game,“’ have a similar structure. 
The principal result of this paper is that, when there are more than two 
firms in the Varian model of sales, there exist a continuum of asymmetric 
equilibria and a unique symmetric equilibrium. This contrasts sharply with 
the 2-firm game in which the unique equilibrium is the symmetric one. 
Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, in all equilibria at least two agents 
randomize continuously over the union of the supports of the equilibrium 
price distributions, just as in the 2-firm game. We call this the two-to-tango 
property. 
While the set of equilibria in the Varian model of sales is large, we show 
that all the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked 
by first-order stochastic dominance. This ordering enables us to construct 
a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players and in which 
asymmetric equilibria are ruled out as subgame perfect equilibria. Intu- 
itively, the asymmetric strategies are not consistent with price dispersion 
’ For particular two-person games, such as the War of Attrition (Hendricks, Weiss and 
Wilson, 1988), capacity-constrained price setting games (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986a), and 
price setting with loyal consumers (Narasimhan, 1988), uniqueness has been thoroughly 
examined. Osborne and Pitchik (1986b) also examine the question of uniqueness in the 3- 
firm “pure” location model of Hotelling (1929). They show that with a uniform distribution 
of consumers, in addition to a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (see Shaked, 1982), 
there is a unique (up to symmetry) asymmetric equilibrium within the class of equilibria in 
which at least one firm uses a pure strategy. 
2 The all-pay auction game is as follows: n players simultaneously bid for the right to buy 
a prize worth Vi to player i. All players forfeit their bid, and the person submitting the highest 
bid wins the prize. Moulin (1986) characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the game when 
V, = 1 Vi. This equilibrium involves mixed strategies that are the mirror image of the mixed 
strategies set forth in Varian (1980). In Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1990), we characterize 
all equilibria for the all-pay auction game. 
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because they imply that distributions of prices charged by some firms 
stochastically dominate those charged by other firms.3 
II. THE MODEL 
Following Varian (1980), consider a market where n 2 2 firms produce 
a homogeneous product with an identical technology exhibiting weakly 
declining average cost.4 The cost curve of each firm is denoted c(q), where 
q is quantity produced. We assume that there are a large number of 
consumers, each of whom will purchase one unit of the good if faced with 
a price less than or equal to a reservation value I-, and none of the good if 
faced with a price greater than r. There are two types of consumers: 
informed and uninformed. Informed consumers purchase a unit of the 
good from the store charging the lowest price, as long as this price is below 
the reservation value. Each uninformed consumer is aware of the price at 
one firm only, and purchases from that firm if the price is no greater than 
Y. We assume that the same number, U, of uninformed consumers shop 
at each store, and that t-U - c(U) > 0.5 The total number of informed 
consumers is I. 
Firms are assumed to set prices simultaneously. Let (pi, . . . , p,) be 
the vector of prices charged by the firms, and define Z? -i to be the minimum 
price charged by any firm other than i, and m-i to be the number of firms 
charging fi-;. Then firm i’s profit is given by 
I 
p;(Z + U) - cu + U) if pi<fi-;adpjsr 
nj(pI, ’ ’ . ,P~ = 
pi(t+ u) -c(&+ u) if Pi=B-isr 
PiU - c(u) if dPi<piIr 
0 if pi>?-. 
Thus, if a firm does not set the lowest price, it services only the U 
uninformed consumers who shop at the store. If a firm sets the lowest 
price, it services all of the informed consumers plus the U uninformed 
3 An important by-product of our analysis of this metagame is that we generalize the model 
of Narasimhan (1988) from 2 firms to n firms. 
4 To focus on essentials, we ignore the entry decision and view n as fixed. Varian assumes 
strictly declining average cost in order to pin down the equilibrium number of firms when 
there is free entry. 
5 See Bagnoli (1986) for a discussion of the importance of this assumption. 
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consumers who shop at the store. In the event several firms tie in charging 
the lowest price, they share the informed consumers equally. 
Varian shows in his Proposition 2 that there is no equilibrium where all 
firms charge the same price. In a sequence of propositions, he derives the 
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to the game. In the following 
section we expand the scope of analysis to determine whether there exist 
asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. 
III. THE FULL SET OF EQUILIBRIA 
In the normal form of the above game, firm i’s strategy is pi E [0, m) and 
its payoff function is II&,, . . . , p,), i = 1, . . . , n. The complete set of 
Nash equilibria will be derived in a series of lemmas. In what follows we 
define 
p’ 
r-U + c(Z + 17) - c(U) 
z+u ’ (D.1) - 
i.e., the price at which a firm selling to both its uninformed consumers and 
the informed consumers obtains the same profit that it would obtain by 
charging the reservation price r and selling only to its uninformed consum- 
ers. A price below p is strictly dominated by setting r. 
Let si and Si denoie the lower and upper bounds of firm i’s equilibrium 
price distribution Gi. When xi = Si, firm i adopts a pure strategy; otherwise 
it employs a mixed strategy. Let oi denote the size of a mass point in i’s 
distribution. 
One equilibrium of this game, a symmetric equilibrium, has been ana- 
lyzed by Varian (1980).6 Our main result, summarized in the following 
theorem, is that there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria as well. 
THEOREM 1. The Varian model of sales possesses two types of equilib- 
ria. Either all firms use the same continuous mixed strategy with support 
[p, r] , or at least twofirms randomize over [p, r], with each otherjirm i 
randomizing over [p, xi), xi < r, and having-a mass point at r equal to 
(1 - Gi(xi)).7 When two or more firms have a positive density over a 
common interval they play the same (continuous) mixed strategy over that 
interval. 
6 After this paper was completed, it was brought to our attention that Bagnoli (1986) found 
a finite number of asymmetric equilibria (see Example 2 below). 
’ We could have xi < p, in which case the interval [ p, xi) is empty and firm i places all - 
mass at r. 
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To prove the theorem we need a sequence of lemmas. 
LEMMA 1. Vi r 2 Si r si 2 p > 0. - 
Proof. By setting pi = r each firm can guarantee itself at least I-U - 
c(U). This rules out prices greater than r, at which firms earn zero. For 
prices less than p, nj < p(Z + U) - c(Z + U) = rU - c(U). Hence, a 
firm will never pike be& p, as more could be earned by charging r. n 
- 
LEMMA 2. Zf 3 i, j s. t. Fj I Fj and ai = 0 then ;Tj = r. Zf Si < Fj lim, t r 
Gj (p) = Gj (Si). Zfin addition cq(Si) = 0 then lim, t r Gj(p) = lim, tsi Gj(p). 
Proof. nj (Sj, Gmj) = SjU - c(U) < rU - c(U) for Sj < r. Since the 
same holds for Il,(p, GPj) for p > Si and p = Si if cui(S,) = 0, the claim 
follows. n 
LEMMA 3. Zf S, = * . . = S,, < S,,,, , , . . . , S, for n 2 m 2 2 then 
3i 5 m such that cq(SJ = 0. 
Proof. Suppose not. Then any i 5 m has an incentive to undercut Si by 
small E > 0. n 
LEMMA 4. Zf S, = . . . = F, < S,,+ ,, . . . , 3, for n 2 m 2 2 then 
Si = rV. I’ 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 3. n 
LEMMA 5. There exists no firm i such that Si < Xj Vj # i. 
Proof. Suppose such a firm did exist. If ai = 0, from Lemma 2 
limp t r Gj(P) = limpts, Gj(P), Vj # i, which implies that II,(si, G-i) < 
limp tr Q(p, Gei). If the claim held and ai > 0 then Vj # i olj(Si) = 0, 
which implies that lim, t r Gj(p) = lim, tsi Gj(p), leading to a similar contra- 
diction. n 
LEMMA 6. Si = r Vi. 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 4 and 5. n 
Let IIT represent the equilibrium profit of firm i = 1, . . . , n. Then we 
have: 
LEMMA 7. IIF = H,+ Vij. 
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose II,+ < n?. With gj being the 
lower bound ofj’s support, IIF < UT = IIjbj, Gmj) 5 limP,tZj Hi(pi, G-J, 
a contradiction. n 
LEMMA 8. n: = rU - c(U) Vi. 
Proof. If (Yi(si) = 0 Vi we are through. If 3j such that orj(Zj) > 0 then 
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ny = rU - c(U) from Lemmas 3 and 6, and with firms earning equal 
profit from Lemma 7, IIT = rU - c(U) Vi. H 
LEMMA 9. 3, j such that Si = sj = p. - 
Proof. Suppose not. Let Si be the second lowest 5, Then the lowest 2 
firm can set a price p slightly below si and earn $ = ~(1 + U) - c(Z + 
U) > I-IF. n 
The previous nine lemmas establish that I = r Vi; there exist two i’s, 
say i = 1, 2, such that 2, = s2 = p; and II: = rU - c(U) Vi. We now 
proceed to pin down the equihbrium distributions. Let W(p) = p( U + I) 
- c(U + I), L(p) = pu - c(U), 
Ai= fi (1 - GJ, and A, = ii (1 - G,). 
j=l k=l 
j#i k#j,i 
LEMMA 10. There are no point masses on the half open interval 
[p, r). 
Proof. Suppose one of the cumulative distribution functions, say Gi, 
has a mass point at pi. Since Vp E [p, r), (1 - Gi)A, > 0, (1 - GSA, has 
a downward jump at pi, Vj # i. This follows directly from the monotonicity 
of the c.d.f.‘s. For pi > p this implies that it is worthwhile for j to transfer 
all mass from an s-neighborhood above pi to some &neighborhood below 
pi. At pi = p it pays for j to transfer mass from an &-neighborhood above 
pi to r. ThusTthere would be an s-neighborhood above pi in which no other 
firm j would put mass. But then it cannot be an equilibrium strategy for 
player i to put mass at pi. n 
Lemma 11 is a generalization of Varian’s Proposition 4. 
LEMMA 11. The integrand 
Bitpi) E W(PJAi(PJ + UPiN - Ai CD.21 
is constant and equal to rU - c(U) at the points of increase of Gi in the 
half open interval [p, r) for all i. - 
Proof, By Lemma 10 there are no point masses in the interval. Thus, 
Bibi) is the expected profit of firm i from setting pi E [ p, r). If pi is a point 
of increase of Gi then firm i must make its equilibriumprofit at pi. n 
LEMMA 12. Suppose p is a point of increase of Gi and Gj in [p, r). - 
Then Gi = Gj at p. 
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Proof. Bi(p) = Bj(p) = rU - c(U). From (D.2) we have 
W@)A~b)(l - Go) + ‘(p)(l - Ag(p)(l - Gj(p))) = VU - C(U). 
This implies that 
A&N - Gj(pN = ‘“~(~~~)~~~‘) = Aji(p)( 1 - G;(p)). 
Division by A&) = Aji(p) > 0 gives Gj(p) = G,(p). n 
LEMMA 13. For every i and every point of increase p ofGi in [p, r) 
there is at least one Gj j # i such that Gj is increasing at p. - 
Proof. Because B,(p) is constant in a half-open neighborhood about 
p by Lemma 11, d&(p) = 0. Suppose contrary to the hypothesis that 
dA,(p) = 0. Totally differentiating Bi(p) gives 
AidW + (1 - A,)dL = 0. 
However, both dW and dL are positive and Ai(p) E (0, 11. Hence for dB,(p) 
to be zero dAi is necessarily negative. By the monotonicity of the Gj’s at 
least one has to increase. n 
LEMMA 14. Zf Gi is strictly increasing on some open subset (x, y), 
p < x < y < r, then Gi is strictly increasing on the whole interval [p, y). - - 
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose, to the contrary, that G, 
were constant on (z, x), p I z < x. Then from Lemma 10, G,(z) = G,(x). 
It is evident that there exists an E > 0 such that on the interval (x - E, x) 
there exist at least two firms, say 1 and m, with strictly increasing c.d.f.‘s 
over the interval (otherwise mass would be moved up to x by some firm). 
Thus, for everyp E (x - E, x), B,(p) = B,,(p) = rU - c(U). Furthermore, 
since there are no mass points in the interval [p, r), B,(x) = B,(x) = 
B,(x) = rU - c(U) which, from arguments similario those used in proving 
Lemma 12, implies that G,(x) = G,(x) = G,(x) < 1. But with 
Bj(x) = B,(X) = B,(p) VP E (X - &, X) 
it must be that B,(p) 5 B,(p) Vp E (x - E, x), since such values of p do 
not lie in i’s support. This implies that A,(p) 2 A,(p), and hence that 1 - 
G,(p) zz 1 - G[(p). This is a contradiction to the fact that G,(x) = G,(x), 
G,(p) is increasing on (x - E, x) and G,(p) is constant on (x - E, x). n 
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LEMMA 15. (It Takes Two to Tango). At least two firms randomize 
continuously on [p, r]. - 
Proof. Three cases are possible at r: (i) all firms allocate positive mass 
at r, (ii) all firms have G,(xi) = 1 at some xi < r, or (iii) there is at least one 
firm i that has a positive left-derivative of Gi at r. Cases (i) and (ii) are 
easily ruled out by previous lemmas. Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 then imply 
that there are at least two firms that randomize continuously over [p, 
r]. n 
- 
LEMMA 16. Once Gi is constant on a subset (x, y), p % x < y < r, it 
is constant on (x, r) and has a mass point at r. 
- 
Proof. The first part is a direct implication of Lemma 14. The second 
part follows from Lemma 6. w 
The above lemmas together establish our Theorem 1. 
Note that in the case where n = 2, Lemmas 12 and 15 and Theorem 1 
imply that the equilibrium of Varian’s model of sales is unique and symmet- 
ric. This illustrates an important property that appears to have implications 
for other games with discontinuous payoffs. The 2-person game may have 
a unique equilibrium but the n-person game does not. In 2-person games, 
in order to make one player indifferent between all pure strategies in its 
support, the other player’s strategy is uniquely determined. In n-player 
games this is generally not true.’ 
Exact expressions for the equilibrium distributions may be obtained 
recursively over the interval [p, r], conditional on the points at which 
firms stop randomizing continu&sly and move remaining mass to r. These 
expressions are provided in Appendix A. Here we give some instructive 
examples. 
EXAMPLE 1. Symmetric Equilibrium (Varian, 1980). From the proof 
of Lemma 12, for n z 2 the symmetric strategies are 
[ 
(r - p)U 1 I/(n- I) l - G = Ip - c(Z + U) + c(U) * 
In this case, all firms randomize continuously on the interval [p, r], and 
use the same strategy. 
EXAMPLE 2. Pure and Mixed Strategies (Bagnoli, 1986). Completely 
* Our result thus serves as yet another warning against the common practice of extrapolat- 
ing from 2 to n. 
EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF SALES 501 
asymmetric strategies arise when k 2 2 firms randomize over [ p, r] and 
n - k firms load all mass at r. The respective strategies are - 
(r - PW 1 IMk- I) l-Gi= zp - c(Z + U) + c(U) fori= 1,. . .,k 
I-Gj= 
lforp<r 
Oforp = r 
forj = k + 1, . . . , n. 
EXAMPLE 3. Intermediate Asymmetric Strategies. The final example 
is a situation where two or more firms randomize over [p, r], and other 
firms randomize over proper subsets [p, xj], p I xj < r,In the case of 
three firms with strategies H, G, and F, an example of the Nash equilibrium 
strategies is 
(r - p)U 1 112 l-H=l-G=l-F= ZP - c(Z + U) + c(U) 
forp E [P, xl - 
l-G=l-F= (r - PNJ 
zp - c(Z + U) + c(U) 1 (1 - H(x))-’ 
forp E [x, r] 
l-H= 
1 - H(x) forp E lx, r) 
0 forp = r, 
where 
(r - x)U 1 112 1 - H(x) = Ix - c(Z + U) + c(U) - 
Note that H, G, and F have a kink at X, but not a jump. 
To conclude, there are an uncountable infinity of payoff-equivalent 
equilibrium mixed strategies. 
IV. ORDERINGTHEASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES 
In this section we show that the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed 
strategies that can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. This 
result will be used in Section V to motivate the symmetric equilibrium as 
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a “reasonable” equilibrium selection by constructing a metagame in which 
it is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
DEFINITION 1. Let F and G be two cumulative distribution functions. 
F is said to strictly first-order stochastically dominate G if sf, dF cr 
sf, dG for all t, with strict inequality holding for some t. 
THEOREM 2. Zf, in a Nash equilibrium, firm i has a larger mass point 
at r than firm j, then the distribution of prices charged by firm i strictly 
first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of prices charged by 
firm j. Zf two$rms load the same mass at r, then their price distributions 
are stochastically equivalent (i.e., G,(p) = Gj(p) VP). 
Proof. Let (G,, . . . , G,) be Nash equilibrium mixed strategies, and 
suppose that firm i loads more mass at r than some firm j. Then by Theorem 
1, associated with firms i and j are Xi’s and xj’s with xi < xj such that firm 
i randomizes continuously on [p, Xi) and loads remaining mass at r, while 
firm j randomizes continuously-on [p, Xj) and loads any remaining mass 
at r. If xi = p, firm i loads all mass at find hence the proposition is trivially 
proved. - 
Hence, suppose p < xi < Xj. Then Gi and Gj are both strictly increas- 
ing for p E [ p, xi), and Lemma 12 reveals that G, = Gj on [ p, xi). Hence 
G,(p) = Gj(~ for p E [p, Xi]; G,(p) < Gj(P) for p E (Xi, r)<nd G,(r) = 
Gj(r). That is, G,(p) strizly first-order stochastically dominates Gj(p). 
If the two firms load the same mass at r, then Theorem 1 implies that 
the firms randomize on the same interval, say [ p, x), and load remaining 
mass at r. Lemma 12 thus implies that the firms have identical distribution 
functions, so that their strategies are stochastically equivalent. n 
The basic idea behind Theorem 2 is depicted in Fig. 1 for the case when 
n = 3. Here, firms 2 and 3 randomize continuously on the interval [p, r], 
while firm 1 randomizes continuously on the interval [p, x1) and l;ads 
mass at r (see Example 3). On the interval [p, x,) all threefirms are equally 
likely to charge low prices. On the interval [x1, r-1, firms 2 and 3 are equally 
likely to charge low prices, but firms 2 and 3 charge lower prices than firm 
1 with probability one, since all of its mass in the interval is at r. Hence, 
G,(p) 5 G&p) = G,(p) for all p, with strict inequality holding for p E 
(xl, 4. 
V. RECONSIDERINGTHE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM 
An important observation by Varian is that most models of price disper- 
sion imply that some stores consistently charge lower prices than other 
stores. Varian argues that if price dispersion is to be an equilibrium phe- 
nomenon, it must be temporal in nature. According to Varian: 
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Gi 
Gi 
1 - 
0 b r P-+ - 
FIG. 1. Stochastic dominance. The figure is drawn on the presumption that V > I. This 
guarantees G” > 0 for n > 2, while G” < 0 necessarily for n = 2. 
In a market exhibiting temporal price dispersion, we would see each store 
varying its price over time. At any moment, a cross section of the market would 
exhibit price dispersion; but because of the intentional fluctuations in price, 
consumers cannot learn from experience about stores that consistently have 
low prices, and hence price dispersion may be expected to persist. (p. 651) 
While these arguments are intuitively plausible, the Varian game is a one- 
shot game,’ and hence the appeal to learning over time as a disciplining 
device is really outside of the model. The idea behind learning is to allow 
the consumers to infer the strategies used by the firms. In games with 
complete information, players know who their opponents are. Hence by 
considering Nash equilibria in a game of complete information, one circum- 
vents the “learning” story; one simply asks if, given the strategies of the 
other players, any player has an incentive to deviate. Nash theory says 
nothing about how agents learn the strategies of opponents, although it 
does make a nice story. For this reason we offer an extensive form of the 
Varian game that is consistent with the spirit of Varian’s arguments. 
Suppose the n firms and M = nU uninformed consumers move simulta- 
neously, the firms choosing their equilibrium price distributions and the 
uninformed consumers each deciding the identity of the firm to which they 
will go to make a purchase decision. After the firms and uninformed 
consumers have moved (the firms having set prices and the uninformed 
9 By Lemma 8 there is a unique Nash equilibrium payoff to the game. Hence, if the game 
is repeated finitely many times, the firms cannot “cooperate” to improve their payoffs, and 
it thus makes sense to think of the Varian game being repeated some large (but finite) number 
of times. 
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having chosen to which firm to go), the informed consumers decide simul- 
taneously from which, if any, firm to purchase. For simplicity, we assume 
that c(q) is zero.” 
We now establish 
THEOREM 3. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the extensive 
form sales game is the symmetric equilibrium.” 
The proof proceeds by several lemmata. Before these are stated, some 
remarks are in order. Note that the only proper subgames of the game 
start at the first node along each of the paths at which an informed con- 
sumer must make a decision where to shop. Subgame perfection requires 
that all informed consumers buy from one of the firms setting the lowest 
price. If the uninformed consumers allocate themselves equally across 
firms and the firms do not play the symmetric equilibrium then they must 
play one of the asymmetric equilibria. By Theorem 2 there will exist some 
firm, say firm 1, whose distribution stochastically dominates some other 
firm’s distribution. This implies that it is not a best response for uninformed 
consumers to shop at the first firm,12 since, on average, they will pay 
lower prices by shopping elsewhere. Suppose, then, that the uninformed 
consumers do not allocate themselves equally across firms. Let Ui be the 
number of uninformed consumers allocating themselves to firm i. We deal 
first with the case where U, < U, < U, I . . . 5 17,. Degenerate cases 
where one of the strict inequalities adjacent to U, is weak require a separ- 
ate analysis. This is carried out in Appendix B. 
Let pi = Uir/(Z + U,), i = 1, . . . , n. By assumption p, < p2 < p3 
5 . . . I p,,. It is easily shown that Lemmas 1 through 6 fr5m Section iX 
hold for this case, where in Lemma 1 we insert pi in place of p in both the 
statement and proof, and the proof of Lemma3 is altered iiian obvious 
fashion. We replace the remaining lemmas of Section III with the lemmas 
that follow. Henceforth, let 2 denote the lower bound of the union of the 
supports of the firms’ equilibrium price distributions. 
LEMMA 7’. 5 2 p2. - 
Proof. Firm i would never put mass below pi since setting price equal - 
to We rule out for now mixed strategies on the part of uninformed consumers, although 
this does not affect the nature of the outcome because firms care only about the expected 
number of uninformed consumers that they serve. 
” If c(q) were to exhibit sufficiently increasing returns to scale, i.e., if c(Z + M)l(Z + M) 
< r while c(Z)/Z > I-, there would also be asymmetric equilibria whereby one firm monopolizes 
the market. Our assumption that c(q) exhibits constant returns to scale rules out this type 
of equilibrium. 
I2 Note that an uninformed consumer’s payoff is linear in price, so that such a consumer 
will go to a store with the lowest expected price. 
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to r strictly dominates such a strategy. Firm 1 clearly has no incentive to 
put mass in the interval [ p ,, p2). n 
- - 
LEMMA 8’. All firms other than firm 1 must place a mass point at r. 
Proof. By Lemma 6, Sj = r Vi. Since s 2 p2 > p,, firm 1 must have 
equilibrium profit IIT of at least (I + U,)p, YrU,.?I’hus, firm 1 cannot 
have a mass point at r since, by Lemma 3, some firm must put no mass at 
r, in which case firm 1 would be undercut at r with certainty and earn t-U, 
there. Since II r > rU,, in every neighborhood below r firm 1 must undercut 
every other firm with positive probability. Thus, every firm but firm 1 must 
put a mass point at r. n 
LEMMA 9’. Vi # 1 IIT = f-U,. 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3 and 8’. n 
LEMMA 10’. 5 = p2 and 2, = sz = z2. - 
Proof. From Lemma 7’ 2 1 p2. Suppose 2 > p2. By undercutting 2 by 
an arbitrarily small amount firm2 could earn arbi5arily close to (I + U& 
> rU, = II,*, a contradiction. Thus, s = p2. The second part of the claim 
is straightforward. n 
- 
LEMMA 11’. There are no point masses on the half open interval 
[p2, 4. 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 10, inserting p2 for p, and noting 
that if firm 1 has a mass point at e2, firm 2 will move mass Up to r, while 
if firm 2 has a mass point at p2 firm 1 will move mass slightly below p2. n 
LEMMA 12’. Bi (Pi) ~ (~+ Vi)p;A;(pi) + Vipi( 1 - Ai( ’ - IS constant 
and equal to IIT at the points of increase ofGi in [ pz, r)for al i. B,(pJ 5 
IIF ifpi is not a point of increase in [p2, r). - 
Proof. Similar to Lemma 11. n 
LEMMA 13’. Vp E [p2, r) 3i,, iz such that V’E > 0 Gi (p + E) - 
Gi (p - E) > 0, i = i, , I& 
Proof. Immediate. n 
LEMMA 14’. si = rVi>2. 
Proof. Without loss of generality assume s, = mini23 xi. Suppose 2, # 
r. Then there exists an initial interval of increase [s3, sj + E) in which 
B,(p) = II,* = U,r = (I + U3)pA3(p) + U,p(l - A,(p)). Thus 
U, = A,(p)-$-Z VP E [Zj, 23 + El. 
But since G, and G, are increasing on [ p2, g3), - 
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U, = A&) 
23 -I. 
r - s3 
Since for ~3 < r: AZ&) = ~jzz (1 - Gj(Sd) > Hj+3 (1 - G&)) = A,&) 
we have a contradiction to the fact that 17, < U3. Thus, s3 = r. n 
We have thus shown that if U, < Cr, < U, I . * * 5 U, then firms 1 and 
2 will continuously randomize over l&, r), with firm 2 having a mass point 
at r and all other firms setting price equal to r with probability one. This 
cannot comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium because the uninformed 
consumers shopping at firms 2 through n would prefer to defect to firm 1, 
given the strategies played. While the degenerate cases where U, = U, = 
. . . = U,,,, m I n, will generally lead to multiple equilibria, the stochastic 
dominance rankings apply, and as long as all the firms are not symmetric 
some uninformed consumers would want to defect. This case is covered 
in Appendix B. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has derived the complete set of equilibria in Varian’s (1980) 
model of sales. In addition to the well known symmetric equilibrium, 
Theorem 1 reveals the existence of a continuum of asymmetric Nash 
equilibrium mixed strategies. While the set of equilibria is thus very large, 
Theorem 2 revealed that the set of equilibrium mixed strategies can be 
ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. We then constructed an exten- 
sive form of the model which, along with the stochastic dominance rank- 
ing, yields Varian’s symmetric equilibrium as the unique subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. 
The basic technology used to characterize the complete set of equilibria 
to the sales game may also be used to characterize the full set of equilibria 
in other games with discontinuous payoffs. For example, results similar 
to those in section III and IV reveal a continuum of equilibrium in the all 
pay auction (see Moulin, 1986, or Weber, 1985). A detailed examination 
of the implications of the asymmetric equilibria in the all pay auction for 
lobbying and patent races is contained in Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries 
(1990). 
APPENDIX A 
The exact expressions for the equilibrium distribution functions in Theo- 
rem 1 may be obtained recursively as follows: If we assume, without loss 
of generality, that firms 1, . . . , m, m 2 2, randomize over [p, r], with - 
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firmsm+ l,..., y1 randomizing over [p, xi), x, % x,-1 5 . . . 5 xm+, < - 
Y, then 
(a> VP E [ P, x,) - 
(r - PW 1 ll(n - I) 1 - G,(p) = zp - c(Z + U) + c(U) Vi. 
(b) Forj = n, n - 1, . . . , m + 2 and ‘t/p E [xj, xj- r) 
l/(j-2) n -l&2) 
1 - G;(p) = 
(r - p)U 
zp - c(Z + U) + c(U) 1 [ E,(l - G&J) 1 
i= 1,. . ., j- 1 
I - G,(p) = 1 - Gi(xi) i=j,. . .,n. 
(4 VP E [X,+I~ 4 
(r - P)U 
m- I)
-N’~-‘) I - G,(p) = 
zp - c(Z + U) + c(U) 1 i fj (1 - Gk(xk)) k=m+l 1 
i= l,...,m 
1 - Gi(p) = 1 - Gi(Xi) i=m+ l,...,n 
(d) 1 - G,(r) = 0 Vi. 
APPENDIX B 
This appendix deals with degenerate rankings of I/,, . . . , U, in the 
proof of Theorem 3. We first deal with the case where U, < U, = 0; = 
. . * = u, < u,,, 5, . . . , 5 U, for some 3 5 m 5 n. It is easily seen 
that for this case the previously altered versions of Lemmas 1 through 6 
hold, as do Lemmas 7’ through 9’. Lemmas 11’ through 13’ also continue 
to hold (with an obvious alteration in the labelling of players in the proof 
of Lemma 11’). Lemmas 10’ and 14’ must be altered (slightly) as follows; 
the proofs require only a minor change in the labelling of players. 
LEMMA 10”. 2 = p2. There exists at least one firm i, 2 I i 5 m, such 
that 3 = p2. 
- 
- 
LEMMA 14". si = r Vi > m. 
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If II > m we are through in our proof that such an allocation of consumers 
cannot be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; firms m + 1, . . . , 
IZ place all mass at r while other firms place mass below r, which contradicts 
the fact that U,, > Uj Vj 5 m. 
Suppose then that n = m, so that U, < U, = U, = . . . = U,. The 
following versions of Lemmas 12 and 14 hold for firms 2, . . . , n. 
LEMMA 15”. 
i, j E (2, . . . , 
Suppose p is a point of increase of Gi and Gj in [pZ, r] , 
n}. Then Gi = Gj at p. 
Proof. Same as proof of Lemma 12. n 
LEMMA 16”. ZfG,, i E (2, . . . , n}, is strictly increasing on some open 
subset (x, y), p2 < x < y < r, then Gi is strictly increasing on the whole 
interval [pZ, ys. - 
Proof. Similar to proof of Lemma 14 where one of the firms 1, m 
must be an element of (2, . . . , n} and this firm is used throughout the 
continuation of the proof. n 
Lemma 16”, together with Lemmas IO” and 13’, imply the following: 
LEMMA 17”. At least one of the firms 2, . . . , n must randomize on 
the interval [pZ, t-1. 
We are now in a position to show that the indicated allocation of consumers 
cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. To do this we show that 
G, is strictly first-order stochastically dominated by Gi, i E (2, . . . , n}. 
LEMMA 18”. s, = pZ, andfor every price 22 < p < r in the support of 
G,, G,(p) > Gi(P), iz (2, . . . , 4. 
Proof. From Lemma 17” at least one of the firms 2, . . . , n has support 
[ p2, r]. Without loss of generality, suppose this is firm 2. From Lemmas 
3%d 8’, firm 1 does not have a mass point at r, and from Lemma 11’ no 
firm has a mass point in [ pZ, r). Thus, there exists some point p E (p2, r) 
at which G,(p) is increasing. At any such point 
B,(P) 2 g*u + U,) 
since the right-hand side is what firm 1 can obtain by charging p2. Rear- - 
ranging this expression, we obtain 
A,(P) 2 [p,U + U,) - PU,YPZ. 
From Lemmas 9’ and 12’ 
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A,(P) = (r - P)WPI. 
Recalling that p2 = rU21(Z + U,) we may subtract A, from A, to obtain - 
A,(P) - A,@) 2 (u, - U,>(P - p,YpZ > 0, 
where the strict right-hand inequality follows from the assumption that 
U, > U, and p > p2. Thus, at any point of increase of G1 in the interval 
( p2, r), A, > A,. T& directly implies that G, > G2 for any such point. But 
&ice G2 has support [p2, r] and G, has no mass points, this implies that 
s1 = p2. Furthermore,Yince for any other firm i E (2, . . . , n} and for any 
p E [T2, r], G,(p) 2 G,(p), we have the claim. n - 
An immediate consequence of Lemma 18” and the fact that G, has no 
mass points is that G,@) 2 G2@) for every p in [p2, r], with strict in- 
equality on the open interval. This contradicts the fact that U, < U,, so 
the given allocation of consumers cannot be part of a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. l3 
The remaining cases to be covered, where U, = U, = . . . = U, < 
U m+l 5 . * . 5 U, for 2 : m 5 IZ - 1, require a mixture of the analysis 
of the symmetric case and asymmetric case. It can be shown that firms 1 
through m may play any m-firm equilibrium of the type outlined in Theorem 
1, while firms m + 1 through n put all mass at r. Since at least two of the 
firms among {I . . . , m} put all probability mass below r, this cannot be 
a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation of consumers. 
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